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Recent Decisions

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIFTH AMENDMENT-DOUBLE JEOPARDY

CLAUSE-The United States Supreme Court held that when
relevant conduct is used to increase an accused's sentence and
the resulting sentence falls within the range specified by
Congress, the resulting sentence is for the crime of conviction
only, and the Government may subsequently prosecute the
accused for the same conduct.
Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199 (1995).
In June of 1990, Steven Kurt Witte ("Witte") and several other
co-conspirators arranged with Roger Norman ("Agent Norman"),
an undercover Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") agent,
to import marijuana from Mexico and cocaine from Guatemala
into the United States.' Thereafter, Witte's Mexican source
advised him that cocaine could be added to the marijuana
shipment.2 In August of 1990, Mexican authorities arrested five
of Witte's co-conspirators and seized 591 kilograms of cocaine at
an airstrip.3 Witte was not arrested at that time.4 In January
of 1991, Witte agreed to purchase marijuana from Agent
Norman.5 On February 7, 1991, after the drug transaction took
1. Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199, 2202 (1995). Agent Norman was
to fly marijuana from Mexico and cocaine from Guatemala into the United States
and Witte was to provide ground transportation once Agent Norman brought the
drugs into the United States. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2202.
2. Id, The cocaine would be included in the shipment if the plane had additional space or if less marijuana than had been anticipated was delivered to Witte's
co-conspirators in Mexico. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. Agent Norman did, however, meet with Witte to explain that because
of the arrest of Witte's co-conspirators at the landing field where Agent Norman was
to acquire the contraband, Agent Norman's pilots were unable to land. Id. The conspiracy temporarily ceased at this point. Id.
5. Id. Agent Norman agreed to sell Witte 1,000 pounds of marijuana, and
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place, Agent Norman arrested Witte and another co-conspirator
in Houston, Texas.6
In March of 1991, Witte was indicted for conspiring and
attempting to possess marijuana with intent to distribute.7 The
indictment included only the January-February 1991
transaction.8 Witte entered into a plea bargain with the
Government under which he agreed to plead guilty to the
attempt charge and cooperate with the Government.9 The
Government agreed to dismiss the conspiracy .charge."0
Furthermore, if Witte substantially cooperated, the Government
agreed to file a motion under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
(the "Guidelines") for a downward departure."
In calculating Witte's sentence, the United States Probation
Office considered the quantity of all drugs, including the
planned 1990 shipments, because under the Guidelines all
"relevant conduct" may be considered. 2 For sentencing

Witte agreed to procure $50,000 for a down payment and provide ground transportation. Id
6. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2202. Witte gave Agent Norman $25,000 of the
$50,000 as a down payment, and DEA undercover agents recovered approximately
375 pounds of marijuana. Id.
7. Id. at 2202-03. Witte was indicted for violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1994),
which provides in pertinent part: "[Ilt shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally . . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled substance." 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).
Witte was also indicted for attempt and conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846
(1994), which provides: "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those
prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or
conspiracy." Id. § 846.
8. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2203.
9. Id. Witte's plea agreement required him to provide "truthful and complete
information concerning this and all other offenses about which [he] might be questioned by agents of law enforcement." Id. Further, the agreement provided that if
needed, Witte would testify for the Government. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. A downward departure is a reduction in sentence which may be granted by the sentencing judge when a defendant has assisted the government in the
investigation or prosecution of another person. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (Nov. 1993) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. The Guidelines direct the sentencing court to consider, among other things, "the significance
and usefulness of the defendant's assistance . . .the truthfulness, completeness and
reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant ... [and] the
nature and extent of the defendant's assistance." Id.
12. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2203. "Relevant conduct" under the Guidelines is defined as:
(1)(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,
induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and
(B) in the case of jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan,
scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert
with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy) all reasonably
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purposes, therefore, Witte was held accountable for the total
amount of drugs involved in the 1990 uncompleted transaction
and the 1991 completed transaction because Witte's conduct was
determined to be part of a continuing conspiracy."
At the sentencing hearing, both the Government and Witte
argued that the 1990 activities were not part of the same
continuing conspiracy."' However, the district court concluded
that the 1990 activities were part of the same continuing
conspiracy and should be considered in determining the
sentence. 5 Therefore, Witte's
sentence was increased two levels
6
for the 1990 activities.
In September of 1992, Witte was indicted for conspiracy and
attempt to import cocaine based on his activities in 1990.17

Witte moved to dismiss on the basis that the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution" prohibits multiple punishments for the same

foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly
undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the
offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of
attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense ....
U.S.S.G., supra note 11, § 1B1.3
13. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2203.
14. Id. The Government argued against including the 1990 cocaine activities as
relevant conduct to enhance Witte's sentence for the 1991 marijuana conviction because the Government wanted to prosecute Witte and gain another conviction which
would result in consecutive sentences. See United States v. Witte, 25 F.3d 250, 253
(5th Cir. 1994), affd, 115 S. Ct. 2199 (1995). Otherwise, the second conviction would
run concurrently with the first if the criminal conduct for the second offense was
considered to be part of the same course of conduct for which Witte had been previously sentenced. See U.S.S.G., supra note 11, § 5G1.3(b) cmt., n.2.
15. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2203. The Guidelines allow a judge to adjust an
accused's sentence for uncharged acts that constitute relevant conduct. U.S.S.G.,
supra note 11, § 1B1.3. The Guidelines also permit a sentencing judge to consider
the "types and quantities of drugs not specified in the count of conviction." Id.
§ 2D1.1 cmt., n.12.
16. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2203. If Witte were sentenced for only the 1991 marijuana transaction, the sentence would have been in the range of 63 to 78 months.
Witte, 25 F.3d at 253. Instead, the inclusion of the 1990 activities increased his sentence to 292 to 365 months. Id. However, for accepting responsibility for his actions,
Witte's sentence was decreased two levels, and because Witte's cooperation was substantial, the Government's request for a downward departure was granted. Id. The
decrease and downward departure to Witte's sentence resulted in Witte being sentenced to 144 months in prison. Id. at 253-54.
17. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2203. Witte was indicted for violating 21 U.S.C. § 963
(1994), which provides that "[any person who attempts or conspires to commit any
offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those
prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or
conspiracy." 21 U.S.C. § 963. In Witte's case, the object of the conspiracy was the
"import[ation] into the United States from any place outside thereof, any controlled
substance." Id. § 952.
18. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in perti-
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crime. 9 The district court agreed and dismissed the indictment
against Witte.'0 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed the district court and held that Witte
could be prosecuted for his 1990 activities." The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari2 ' because the holding of the
Fifth Circuit contradicted rulings of the Tenth Circuit and
Second Circuit Courts of Appeals. 3
The United States Supreme Court held that relevant conduct
may be used to enhance Witte's sentence; and because the
resulting sentence fell within the range specified by Congress,
the punishment was for the offense of conviction only. 4
Therefore, the Court held that Witte may be subsequently
prosecuted and punished for conduct used to enhance his prior
sentence."
nent part that no person shall be "subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
19. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2203-04.
20. Id. at 2204. The district court dismissed the Government's action against
Witte because Witte's double jeopardy rights would be violated if Witte were punished at a criminal trial for the second charge because the conduct forming the basis
for the second charge was considered by the sentencing judge to be "relevant conduct" and had already been used as a basis for increasing Witte's sentence for the
first charge. See Witte, 25 F.3d at 254.
21. Witte, 25 F.3d at 263. The Fifth Circuit noted that while Double Jeopardy
always prohibits multiple prosecutions for the same offense, it does not prohibit
multiple punishments for the same offense. Id. at 254-55. The court concluded that
no issue of multiple prosecutions arose because Witte was never prosecuted in a
criminal proceeding for his 1990 activities. Id. at 255.
The Supreme Court interpreted the Fifth Circuit's opinion as holding that
the use of Witte's 1990 uncharged conduct to enhance his sentence for his 1991
activities did not constitute "punishment" for the prior conduct. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at
2204. The Fifth Circuit did recognize such a principle. However, the Fifth Circuit
did not base its ruling on this principal, but instead found that Congress intended
to permit a second punishment for prior conduct that was subsequently used to increase a related sentence. Witte, 25 F.3d at 258-60 (citing Williams v. Oklahoma,
358 U.S. 576 (1959)).
22. Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 715 (1995) (granting certiorari).
23. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2204. Both the Tenth and Second Circuits held that
when relevant conduct of an accused is considered in determining punishment under
the Guidelines, the accused may not be subsequently indicted on charges based on
that same conduct. Id. See United States v. McCormick, 992 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1993)
(holding that because Congress did not intend for the accused to be punished in
other states for similar schemes to defraud, the accused could not be punished in
Connecticut for the fraudulent conduct after a Vermont court used the Connecticut
conduct to enhance his sentence for fraud in Vermont); United States v. Koonce, 945
F.2d 1145 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that because the legislature did not intend for
the accused to be punished under both South Dakota and Utah law for mailing
methamphetamines from South Dakota to Utah, the accused could not be punished
in Utah after the Utah possession was used to enhance his sentence for conviction
of possession in South Dakota), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 994 (1992).
24. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2208.
25. Id. at 2209.
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Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion for the majority2 6 and
affirmed the doctrine that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits
the Government from both prosecuting and punishing an
accused more than once for the same offense. 7 However,
Justice O'Connor noted that Witte was never prosecuted or
convicted for his 1990 criminal activities."5 The Court noted
that Witte was prosecuted only for his 1991 offenses.2" The
Court reasoned that Witte's 1991 conviction for attempt to
import marijuana and the subsequent prosecution for the 1990
conspiracy and attempt to import cocaine were not the same
offense; therefore, the subsequent prosecution for Witte's 1990
activities was not prohibited."
Moreover, before Witte's double jeopardy rights could be
violated, the majority concluded that Witte must have been
previously punished for his 1990 criminal activities."'
Punishment, according to the Court, goes beyond the imposition
of the sentence.32 Thus, the Court determined that because
Witte was never convicted for his 1990 activities, the
enhancement of Witte's prior sentence did not amount to
punishment for that same conduct. 3
In support of its holding, the Court first determined that the
Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Oklahoma3 ' was
controlling.35 The Court noted that in Williams, the Court held
that a sentencing court may use a separate crime to enhance an
26. Id. at 2202. Justice O'Connor was joined in Parts I, II, and IV of the
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer; and in Part III of the opinion by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. Id.
27. Id. at 2204. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). In Halper,
the Court noted that it had "many times held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
protects against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense." Halper, 490 U.S. at 440.
28. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2204.
29. Id.
30. Id. The Court applied the test announced in Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299 (1932), in which the Court stated: "[Wihere the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied
to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision
requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
31. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2205. In determining sentences, the Court noted that
judges have traditionally considered an accused's prior convictions and past criminal
behavior which had not resulted in a conviction. Id.
32. Id. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 862 (1985) (finding that
"punishment' must be the equivalent of a criminal conviction and not simply the
imposition of the sentence.").
33. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2208.
34. 358 U.S. 576 (1959).
35. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2206.
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accused's sentence only if the resulting sentence falls within the
statutorily authorized range of punishment for that crime.3"
Second, the Court noted that it had continuously upheld
recidivism statutes that allow judges to consider earlier crimes
as aggravating circumstances in order to enhance a sentence for
a later crime." Third, the majority cited McMillan v.
Pennsylvania," in which the Court held that a standard of
proof below the standard required at a criminal trial is
permissible at sentencing hearings in order to prove additional
facts that relate to an accused's character and conduct.39
Therefore, the Court concluded that when uncharged relevant
conduct has been considered in imposing a sentence, the
resulting sentence is not punishment for the uncharged conduct,
but, instead, is punishment for the crime of conviction only.'
In addressing Witte's concerns that he should not receive a
second sentence for the 1990 cocaine activities that were used to
enhance his sentence for the 1991 marijuana offense, the Court
determined that safeguards exist to protect against violating
Witte's double jeopardy rights.4 ' First, the Court found that the
Guidelines require an accused's sentences to run concurrently if
the accused was convicted for conduct that was used to enhance
a prior sentence.42 In addition, the Court found that the
Guidelines allow district courts, in some cases, to consider the
fact that a prior sentence was enhanced by the conduct for
which the accused had been convicted and now stood to be
sentenced.' The Court concluded that sentencing courts have
retained discretion because sentences outside the parameters of
the Guidelines may be imposed when aggravating or mitigating
circumstances not covered by the Guidelines have been

36. Id. In Williams, the accused had previously pled guilty to murdering his
kidnapped victim. Williams, 358 U.S. at 585. In accord with the state sentencing
statute, the sentencing judge took the accused's prior guilty plea for murder into
consideration in determining the accused's sentence for the kidnapping conviction. Id.
The sentencing judge imposed the death penalty, and the Supreme Court upheld the
sentence. Id. at 580-81, 586-87.
37. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2206. The later sentence, according to the Court, is
more severe because the crime is repetitive. Id.
38. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
39. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2206-07. In McMillan, the Court affirmed a five-year
minimum sentence because the sentencing judge found, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that during the commission of the felony, the accused "visibly possessed a
firearm." McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91-92.
40. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2207.
41. Id. at 2208-09.
42. Id. The Court followed the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the Guidelines.
See Witte, 25 F.3d. at 261.
43. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2209.
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proved."
In a concurring opinion,' Justice Scalia criticized the
majority's finding that Witte's second prosecution did not violate
his double jeopardy rights.46 According to Justice Scalia, the
majority mistakenly viewed Witte's enhanced punishment as
punishment for the crime of conviction only and not as
punishment for the uncharged, relevant conduct.4 Justice
Scalia accused the majority of destroying the traditional
protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause as previously
interpreted by the Court." However, Justice Scalia concurred
because he contended that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits
only subsequent prosecutions, not subsequent punishments for
the same offense, and Witte had not been prosecuted twice for
the same crime.49
Justice Stevens dissented in part from the Court's holding"0

44. Id. The Guidelines permit a sentencing judge to impose a sentence outside
the range set by Congress if the judge determines "that there exists an aggravating
or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should
result in a sentence different from that described." U.S.S.G., supra note 11, § 5K2.0,
policy statement.
45. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2209 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Thomas joined in
the concurrence. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2210.
48. Id. Justice Scalia contended that the Court departed from the traditional
meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause upheld in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S.
435 (1989). Id. at 2209. Justice Scalia criticized the majority particularly because he
believed that the majority was destroying the right created previously by the Court
that protected against subsequent punishments. Id. According to Justice Scalia, the
majority was giving Witte the following message: "We do not punish you twice for
the same offense . . .but we punish you twice as much for one offense solely because you also committed another offense, for which other offense we will also punish you (only once) later on." Id. at 2210. Justice Scalia could see no difference in
the majority's distinction. Id.
49. Id at 2210. Justice Scalia gave no reason for this view, but cited his dissent in Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948
(1994) (holding that a civil tax imposed on a person previously accused and prosecuted for possession of drugs is a second punishment which violates the accused's
double jeopardy rights) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Id. In dissent in Kurth Ranch, Justice
Scalia clearly contended that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit successive punishments. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1959. Further, in dissent in Kurth
Ranch, Justice Scalia insisted that the Eight Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment restricts subsequent punishments so far as the "nature" of the
punishment is concerned, and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive
bails restricts the "cumulative extent" of the punishment. Id. Finally, Justice Scalia
concluded in Kurth Ranch that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits successive prosecutions, while the Due Process Clause governs cumulative punishments. Id.
50. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2210 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Stevens found that Witte was already punished for his 1990 cocaine
attempt offense because Witte's sentence was enhanced by over 200 months at the
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because he believed that the majority overlooked an important
distinction made in the Guidelines between the character of an
offense and the character of an offender.5 1 The character of an
accused, according to Justice Stevens, has been provided for in
the Guidelines under the "criminal history" section.52 Justice
Stevens asserted that because the character of an accused is
revealed by prior convictions, a recidivist's sentence should be
greater than it would be if the accused were a first-time
offender. 3 The character of an offense, according to Justice
Stevens, has also been provided for in the Guidelines under the
"relevant conduct" section. " However, Justice Stevens
contended that if relevant conduct is used to enhance an
accused's sentence, the relevant conduct has the same effect on
an accused's sentence as it would have if the sentence were the
result of a criminal trial and conviction; and, therefore,
subsequent prosecution is barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause.5
Although Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's finding
that the Guidelines generally ensure that an accused's sentences
in two proceedings will amount to no more than the sentence the
accused would have received had the offenses been consolidated
into one trial, Justice Stevens disagreed that the safeguards
within the Guidelines protect against Double Jeopardy
violations." Justice Stevens asserted that Double Jeopardy
protects an accused from more than just a second

sentencing hearing for the 1991 offense. Id.
51.

Id. at 2211.

52. Id. See U.S.S.G., supra note 11, § 4Al.1 (providing that an accused's sentence may be increased for prior offenses for which the accused had been previously
sentenced or when the instant offense had been committed while on probation, parole, etc., or when the offense was a violent crime which was not included in any
other point category).
53. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2211. Justice Stevens reasoned that a recidivist's sentence should be increased not because the recidivist should be punished for prior
bad acts, but instead, because the recidivist has refused to reform, and the
recidivist's bad character has been revealed by a prior criminal record. Id. A "recidivist" is one who repeatedly commits crimes. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (6th ed.

1990).
54. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2210. See supra note 12 for the Guidelines' definition
of "relevant conduct."
55. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2212. Justice Stevens reasoned that imposing punishment at a sentencing hearing for prior conduct not proven at a criminal trial would
produce the same result as if the accused had been punished after a criminal trial.
Id. According to Justice Stevens, Witte's sentence was based on the totality of the
drugs under both the 1990 and 1991 transactions. Id. Therefore, Justice Stevens
concluded that Witte was already sentenced for his 1990 cocaine activity. Id.
56. Id. at 2213, 2214 n.4.
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Double Jeopardy, according to Justice Stevens,
against the burdens incidental to a second
Moreover, Justice Stevens contended that even if
receive an additional sentence at the second trial,

a second conviction in and of itself is punishment and is
forbidden by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 9
Finally, Justice Stevens asserted that the Court had already
rejected the idea that punishment has occurred only when an
accused has been convicted at a criminal trial.6 According to
Justice Stevens, the two cases relied on by the Court, McMillan

and Williams, did not support its holding."'
The Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy
was clearly established in 1873 in Ex Parte Lange,62 when the
United States Supreme Court decided the issue of whether a
sentencing court may impose both a fine and imprisonment
when a statute provides alternative sentences of fine or
imprisonment."
In Lange, the accused was convicted of
appropriating, for his own personal use, mailbags of the United
States Post Office." The statute provided alternative sentences
of either imprisonment for one year or less, or a fine of not more
than two hundred dollars;"5 however, the judge imposed both

57, Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. Justice Stevens cited Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865 (1985)
(holding that a "second conviction, even if it results in no greater sentence, is an
impermissible punishment.").
60. Witte, 115 S. Ct at 2213.
61. Id. at 2212-13 The majority cited McMillan to support the view that the
enhancement of a sentence based on information proven at a sentencing hearing
does not amount to punishment. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2208. Justice Stevens cited
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 438 (1982) and Department of Revenue of
Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994) as the Court's rejection of the
proposition that "punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause only occurs when a
court imposes a sentence for an offense that is proven beyond a reasonable doubt at
a criminal trial." Id. at 2213.
Additionally, Justice Stevens contended that Williams, the principal case
relied on by the Court, was decided over ten years before the Double Jeopardy
Clause was applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. See
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (holding that the Double Jeopardy
Clause "should apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.").
62. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
63. Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 175.
64. Id. at 166.
65. Id. Lange was convicted under a federal statute, which read in pertinent
part: "[A]ny person who shall steal, purloin, or embezzle any mail-bag or other property in use by or belonging to the Post-office Department . . . shall ...

if the value

of the property be less than twenty-five dollars . . . be imprisoned not more than
one year, or be fined not less than ten nor more than two hundred dollars." Act of
June 8, 1872, ch. 335, 17 Stat. 320 § 290 (repealed).
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sentences.6 The Court held that once an alternative
punishment is imposed by a sentencing court, the sentencing
court lacks authority to impose additional punishment. 7
According to the Court, the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection
against a second punishment, based on the same facts, for the
same offense was a well-settled principle in English and
American law.68 The Court further reasoned that protecting
against the risk of a second punishment is most important
because, without it, a sentencing court could impose several
sentences on the same verdict.69 The constitutional protection
against Double Jeopardy, the Court concluded, clearly protects
an accused from being prosecuted or punished a second time for
the same offense.70
Twenty years later, in Moore v. Missouri,7 the Court
considered the question of whether an accused's double jeopardy
rights are violated by a state statute that permits an accused's
second sentence to be increased based on a prior conviction.72
In Moore, the accused had previously been convicted and
sentenced for grand larceny and had served his term.7" After
release, the accused was convicted of burglary in the second
degree, and the court considered the prior conviction for grand
larceny when imposing a life sentence on the accused.74 The
Court held that a state may inflict harsher sentences for
subsequent convictions if the state treats all who are similarly

66. Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 166. After the accused paid the fine and
spent five days in jail, the sentencing court changed the sentence to only imprisonment for one year. Id.
67. Id. at 176. Therefore, the Court ordered the accused to be released from
prison. Id. at 178.
68. Id. at 168.
69. Id. at 167-71.
70. Id. at 169.
71. 159 U.S. 673 (1895).
72. Moore, 159 U.S. at 676.
73. Id. at 673-74.
74. Id. at 673. The Missouri statute, under which the accused was sentenced,
reads in pertinent part:
If any person convicted of any offence punishable by imprisonment in the
penitentiary . . . shall be discharged . . . and shall subsequently be convicted
of any offence committed after such pardon or discharge, he shall be punished
as follows: First, if subsequent offense be such that, upon a first conviction,
the offender would be punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for life,
or for a term which, under the provisions of this law, might extend to imprisonment in the penitentiary for life, then such person shall be punished by
imprisonment for life.
MO. REV. STAT. § 3959 (1879) (current version at MO. ANN. STAT. § 558.016 (Vernon
1979)).
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situated the same.7" The Court found that an increased
punishment is not a second punishment for a first offense
because an offender's persistence in committing crimes reveals a
need for greater punishment.76 The offender, according to the
Court, did not change after the first punishment." The offender
chose to repeat the crime; therefore, the Court reasoned78 that the
offender's own conduct aggravated the offender's guilt.

The question of whether the Government may prosecute an
accused for violating more than one statute based on a single act
was addressed by the Court in Blockburger v. United States.79
In Blockburger, the accused made two sales of morphine
hydrochloride to the same person.80 For the first sale, the
accused was found guilty of one count of selling drugs not in the
original stamped package.8 1 For the second sale, the accused
was found guilty of violating two separate statutes: selling drugs
not in the original stamped package and selling drugs without a
written order from the purchaser. 2 The Court held that when
an accused has been charged with the violation of two statutes
from a single act or transaction, the test to be applied is
whether each of the offenses charged against the accused
requires proof of at least one additional fact not included in the
elements of the other offense.83 The Court determined that
Congress intended to create two separate offenses, and because
each included proof of additional elements not contained in the
other, the accused's single act violated both statutes.' Thus,

75.
76.

Moore, 159 U.S. at 678.
Id. at 677.

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 284 U.S. 299, 301 (1932).
80. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301.
81. Id. The Harrison Act, under which the accused in Blockburger was convicted, provided that "it shall be unlawful for any person to purchase, sell, dispense, or
distribute any of the aforesaid drugs except in the original stamped package or from
the original stamped package." Harrison Act, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785, 786 (1914), amended by ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1131 (1919) (repealed 1939). The "aforesaid drugs" include "opium or cocoa leaves or any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, or preparation thereof." Id. at 785.
82. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301. The accused in Blockburger argued that the
charge for the sale of drugs not in the original stamped package and the charge for
the sale of drugs without a written order from the purchaser were the same offense;
and, therefore, the accused should have been charged only once. Id. The Harrison
Act, under which the accused was convicted, provides that "lilt shall be unlawful for
any person to sell, barter, exchange, or give away any of the aforesaid drugs except
in pursuance of a written order of the person to whom such article is sold." ch. 1,
38 Stat. at 786.
83. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
84. Id.
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the Court held that the accused could be prosecuted under both
s
statutes.&
In Williams v. Oklahoma,"6 the Court had to determine
whether a sentencing court could impose the death penalty for
kidnapping when the accused had previously pled guilty to
murdering his kidnapped victim." The accused first pled guilty
M The
to a charge of murder and was sentenced to life in prison."
89 At sentencing
accused subsequently pled guilty to kidnapping.
the court considered the fact that the accused murdered his
victim and sentenced the accused to death. ° The Court held
that the accused was not being punished a second time for the
same offense.9 First, the Court reasoned that under Oklahoma
law, kidnapping and murder are separate crimes; and, therefore,
the charge of kidnapping does not include murder.2 Next, the
Court recognized that Oklahoma had enacted a statute that
provided a range of sentencing for kidnapping, which included
death. 3 The Court determined that a judge may consider all
aggravating and mitigating circumstances related to a crime."
Therefore, the Williams Court concluded that the accused's act
of killing his victim could be considered at sentencing because it
was an aggravating circumstance.
Whereas the Court in Blockburger determined the issue of
whether the Government may prosecute violations of multiple
85. Id. Additionally, the Court determined that the accused made two distinct
sales of drugs not in the original stamped package because the first sale was complete and the second sale was the result of a new bargain. Id. at 303.
86. 358 U.S. 576 (1959).
87. Williams, 358 U.S. at 581. The accused in Williams kidnapped and killed
a young man. Id. at 577-78. The accused forced himself into the victim's car, held
the victim at gunpoint, shot and killed the victim, and then escaped in the victim's
car. Id.
88. Id. at 578.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 578, 581. The statute under which the accused was sentenced provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, without lawful authority, forcibly seizes and confines another or inveigles or kidnaps another, for the purpose of extorting any money,
property or thing of value or advantage from the person so seized . . . shall
be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall suffer death or imprisonment
in the penitentiary, not less than ten (10) years.
OKLA- STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 745 (1951) (current version at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 681 (West 1983)).
91. Williams, 358 U.S. at 586.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 585. See OKL.& STAT. ANN tit. 21, § 681.

94. Williams, 358 U.S. at 586. According to the Court, imposing the death
penalty for kidnapping is solely within the discretion of the sentencing judge who
must consider all the facts involved in the crime. Id. at 585.
95. Id. at 585.

1996

Recent Decisions

1159

6
statutes by a single act, the Court in Ball v. United States"
determined the subsidiary issue of whether an accused may be
convicted and punished for multiple violations of a statute by a
single act. 7 In Ball, the accused was convicted of both illegal
receipt of a firearm and illegal possession of a firearm." The
Court determined that before a sentencing court may punish, it
must ascertain whether Congress intended for the single act to
be punished under different statutes.9 The Court applied the
Blockburger test and determined that "punishment" must consist
of more than a sentence-it must amount to a criminal
conviction.1 "e According to the Ball Court, Congress must have
intended for separate punishments to punish for the same
conduct; otherwise, an accused could not be convicted or
punished for multiple offenses.' 01 Because receipt of the
firearm required that the accused in Ball also possess it, the
intended to subject
Court decided that Congress could not have
10 2
act.
same
the
for
convictions
two
to
Ball
One year later, in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,' the Court
confronted the issue of whether a state, for sentencing purposes,
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt a particular fact that
aggravated the crime but which was not proven at the criminal
trial.'" At issue was a Pennsylvania statute which requires a
sentencing judge to impose a minimum sentence if, at the
sentencing hearing, it was proved by a preponderance of the

96. 470 U.S. 856 (1985).
97. Ball, 470 U.S. at 859, 861. The accused was convicted of both receiving
and possessing a firearm shipped in interstate commerce from South Carolina to
Virginia and was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment. Id. at 857-58.
98. Id. at 858. The accused in Ball was convicted of receiving a firearm under
18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1988), which provides, in pertinent part, that it "shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce."
18 U.S.C. § 922(h). The accused was also convicted of possessing a firearm under 18
U.S.C. § 1202(a) (repealed 1986) which provided, in pertinent part, that anyone who
"has been convicted by a court of the United States . . . of a felony . . . and who
receives, possesses, or transports in commerce . . . any firearm shall be fined . . . or

imprisoned." Id. § 1202(a).
99. Ball, 470 U.S. at 862.
100. Id. at 861. See supra note 30 for the text of the Blockburger test.
101. Ball, 470 U.S. at 861.
102. Id. Moreover, the Court reasoned that requiring the sentences to run concurrently would not remedy the problem. Id. at 864. The Court reasoned that Congress did not intend to punish for both offenses, and further, because Congress authorized only one punishment, the accused's additional sentence did not disappear
merely because it was served at the same time as the other sentence. Id. at 864-65.
103. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
104. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84.
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evidence that the convicted visibly possessed a firearm during
the commission of certain felonies." 5 Each of the accused in
McMillan was convicted of a felony included in the sentencing
statute.01 6 The Court held that the state did not have to prove
possession beyond a reasonable doubt because possession is a
sentencing factor and not a element of the crime.' 7 According
to the Court, the principle requiring states to prove the elements
of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt pertains only to criminal
trials.' 8 The Court reasoned that the state legislature decided
not to include the visible possession of a firearm as an element
of certain felonies, but instead to include it in the sentencing
° The Court concluded that sentencing courts merely
statute.'O
determine whether a firearm was used in committing a felony,
and the statute sets the punishment if the fact is proven at the
sentencing hearing by a preponderance of the evidence."'
The question of whether a civil penalty constitutes
punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause when an accused
has been previously convicted and sentenced for the same
conduct arose in United States v. Halper."' In Halper, the

105. Id. The Pennsylvania sentencing statute at issue provides that a person
convicted of "murder of the third degree, voluntary manslaughter, rape, involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse, robbery . . . aggravated assault . . . or kidnapping...
shall, if the person visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of the offense,
be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least five years of total confinement." 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702 (1982). The statute further directs the sentencing judge to
"consider any evidence presented at the trial and . . . afford the Commonwealth and
the defendant an opportunity to present any necessary additional evidence and [to]
determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, if this section is applicable." Id.
106. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 82. Petitioner McMillan shot his victim after an
argument and was convicted of aggravated assault. Id. Petitioner Peterson shot and
killed her husband and was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Id. Petitioner
Dennison shot an acquaintance and was convicted of aggravated assault. Id. Petitioner Small robbed a store at gunpoint and was convicted of robbery. Id.
107. Id. at 90.
108. Id. at 85. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the
"Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged."). See also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) (holding
that the "Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged.").
However, the McMillan Court further held that the Court had previously rejected the requirement that all facts considered at a sentencing hearing which affect
the sentence be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. McMilan, 477 U.S. at 84. See
Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207 (refusing to hold that facts which are related to the "severity of punishment" must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
109. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85-86.
110. Id. at 91. Consequently, the Court noted that the Winship principle was
not violated. Id. at 89.
111. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
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accused was convicted of over sixty counts of making false,
fictitious or fraudulent claims against the United States and was
sentenced and fined."' After Halper's conviction, the
Government sought to recover damages through a civil action
against Halper."' The Halper Court reasoned that the
determining factor was the purpose of the sanction, not the
nature of the proceeding."" Consequently, the Court
recognized that it did not matter whether a proceeding is called
civil or criminal because the name of the proceeding does not
determine whether the Constitution is violated." 5 The Court
concluded that the aim of the subsequent civil action was to
punish; and, therefore, the accused's double jeopardy rights were
violated because the accused had already been tried, convicted
and sentenced for the same conduct."'
After a review of the history of the Double Jeopardy Clause,
the conclusion is inescapable that the Supreme Court has
stepped beyond constitutionally tolerable limits. Prior to
McMillan, the Court stood on firm constitutional ground. In both
Moore and Williams, increasing an accused's sentence was
justified by prior convictions." 7 However, no prior conviction
112. Halper, 490 U.S. at 437. The accused worked as a manager for a medical
laboratory which provided medical services for New York City patients who were
eligible for Medicare. Id. The accused submitted claims to Blue Cross which contained fees that were higher than the services actually rendered. Id. Blue Cross forwarded the overcharges to the federal government. Id. The accused was sentenced to
two years imprisonment and fined $5,000. Id.
The civil code under which the accused was prosecuted read in pertinent
part:
A person . . . is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of
$2,000, an amount equal to 2 times the amount of damages the Government
sustains because of the act of that person, and costs of the civil action, if the
person . . . knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved.
31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1983) (amended 1986).
113. Halper, 490 U.S. at 438.
114. Id. at 447.
115. Id. at 447-48.
116. Id. at 448, 452. Therefore, the Court held that the additional civil penalty
was a second punishment which violated the accused's double jeopardy rights. Id. at
452. The Court clearly stated that the rule it announced was for "the rare case, the
case such as the one before us, where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific
but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has caused." Id. at 449. However, the Court noted that its rule is a rule
based on reason. Id.
117. See Moore, 159 U.S. at 673; Williams, 358 U.S. at 581. Enhancing an
accused's sentence based on recidivism, as the Court held in Moore, is justifiable
because the offender refused to change his criminal ways. Moore, 159 U.S. at 677.
Enhancing an accused's sentence based on the commission of additional crimes, as
the Court held in Williams, is also justifiable because of the aggravating nature of
the offense. Williams, 358 U.S. at 586.
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existed in Witte's case. "8 The Court continued to stand on firm
constitutional ground in Blockburger and Ball when it ruled that
an accused could be prosecuted and punished for violations of
multiple statutes if Congress intended that an accused be
However, the
punished under the applicable statutes.'
question in Witte was not whether Witte may be punished for
both offenses.' Instead, the critical question was whether
Witte, in fact, had already been punished for the offense."
The Court was required to address two elements in order to
determine whether Witte was already punished for uncharged
conduct. First, the Court addressed the issue of whether a
sentencing court may increase an accused's sentence for conduct
not proven at a criminal proceeding."2 Second, the Court
addressed the question of whether once an accused's sentence
has been enhanced, may the Government subsequently
prosecute and punish the accused for that same conduct?'
First, by allowing proof of the possession of a firearm to be
established at a sentencing hearing by a preponderance of the
evidence,' the Court in McMillan took its first step into
constitutionally-impermissible territory and gave its blessing to
punishment without a prior conviction."' In circumventing the

118.

Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2203.

119. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. The Court determined in Blockburger
that an accused could not be prosecuted for the same act under more than one statute unless the statutes contain one element of the crime that the others did not. Id.
In Ball, the Court held that an accused may only be punished for violating more
than one statute by the same act if Congress must have intended for a accused to
be punished under both offenses. Ball, 470 U.S. at 861.
120. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2203-04. Witte did not appeal the sentencing enhancement. See Witte, 25 F.3d at 254.
121. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2204. Witte asked the district court to dismiss the
subsequent indictment against him because he was already punished for the conduct
at the prior sentencing hearing. Id. at 2203-04. Consequently, the issue on appeal
was whether or not the sentencing enhancement was the equivalent of punishment
for double jeopardy purposes. Id. at 2204.
122. Id. at 2206-07.
123. Id. at 2207-09.
124. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91.
125. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SENTENCING § 18-3.6 (3d ed.
1994) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. The ABA rejects sentencing which allows a
judge to consider uncharged conduct in determining sentences because the "infliction
of punishment for a given crime ought to be preceded by conviction for that crime."
Id.
Judge Norris of the Ninth Circuit warned that "a defendant whose liberty is
at stake in a sentencing hearing is accorded less procedural protection than is an
alien facing deportation, a mentally-ill person facing civil commitment, or a defendant in a civil fraud suit." Forum on the Sentencing Guidelines: Suggestions for the
New Administration and the 103rd Congress, 5 FED. SENT. REPTR. 187 (1993) [hereinafter Forum].

1996

Recent Decisions

1163

requirement of a criminal conviction and allowing punishment
for uncharged conduct to be imposed at a sentencing hearing,
the Court sanctioned the violation of an accused's constitutional
rights under the Sixth and Fourth Amendments. ' Unlike a
criminal trial, a sentencing hearing does not guarantee an
accused's rights to a jury trial, to confront witnesses, or to
exclude evidence obtained by an illegal search.'27 Furthermore,
judges at sentencing hearings are permitted to admit evidence,
including hearsay, that would otherwise be inadmissible in a
criminal proceeding. 2 '

126. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 125, § 18-3.6. The ABA suggests that an
accused's Sixth Amendment guarantees to a jury trial and to confront witnesses, as
well as the Fourth Amendment protection against unlawful searches and seizures,
are not afforded at sentencing hearings. Id.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides:
In all criminal proceedings, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district where the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend VI.
The Sixth Amendment right to confront requires that all witnesses against
the accused appear and testify in court, with the accused present, so that the accused may cross-examine such witnesses. BLACWS LAW DICTIONARY 300 (6th ed.
1990).
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend IV.
The Fourth Amendment's protection against unlawful searches and seizures
prohibits the prosecution from using illegally-obtained or tainted evidence against an
accused at his trial. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (6th ed. 1990).
127. Edward R. Becker, Insuring Reliable Fact Finding in Guidelines Sentencing: Must the Guarantees of the Confrontation and Due Process Clauses be Applied,
22 CAP. U. L. REv. 1 (1993). Becker states:
The defendant has no absolute right to compel the attendance of witnesses at
the sentencing hearing . . . or to confront the prosecution's sources that may
be used to enhance the sentence. Indeed there is no absolute right to a hearing. All of the procedures are within the discretion of the sentencing
judge ....
Id. at 9-10.
128. See U.S.S.G., supra note 11, § 6A1.3. The Guidelines provide that when
sentencing judges determine facts relevant to the sentencing, the judge "may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy." Id The Guidelines also provide that a court
may admit reliable hearsay and out-of-court statements by unidentified informants.
Id. § 6A1.3 cmt.
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The decision in McMillan makes the decision in Witte
possible. Only after the Court crossed the constitutional
boundary in McMillan to allow uncharged conduct to be used at
sentencing hearings to enhance the sentence for a crime of
conviction could the Court in Witte then sanction the violation of
an accused's double jeopardy rights by allowing the accused to
be subsequently prosecuted and punished for the very same
conduct used to enhance a prior sentence.'29
In determining the second issue, the Court should have
followed the reasoning used in Halper because Halper is most
analogous to Witte. In both Witte and Halper, the sentencing
courts attempted to punish an accused twice for the same
conduct. However, in Halper, the disguised attempt to punish a
second time occurred after the criminal trial and conviction.
Whereas in Witte, the disguised attempt to punish occurred
before the criminal trial and conviction. Furthermore, in
following Halper, the Witte Court would not have looked to the
label "sentencing hearing" to determine if Witte's double
jeopardy rights were violated. 30 Instead, the Witte Court
would have looked to the purpose of the sentencing hearing and
determined that the Constitution was violated.'31
Although the Guidelines camouflage the double jeopardy
violation by requiring Witte's two sentences to run concurrently,
the second sentence does not disappear simply because it runs
concurrently with the first.3 2 Moreover, even if Witte did not
serve one additional day in jail, as Justice Stevens pointed out,
the burden of a second prosecution, and more importantly, any
See also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 125, § 18-3.6. The ABA found that at
sentencing hearings, the "rules of evidence are not in force and the admission of
hearsay, even double and triple hearsay, is commonplace." Id. Hearsay evidence is
defined as "testimony in court of a statement made out of court . . . offered to show
the truth of matters asserted therein." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 722 (6th ed. 1990).
Hearsay is repetition of what a witness has heard another say; therefore, the reliability of the statement is questionable because the credibility of the statement cannot be derived from the witness who is testifying. Id.
The statutory authority to enhance sentences based on uncharged conduct
concerns several federal judges. See Forum, supra note 125, at 187. Judge Noonan of

the Ninth Circuit stated in the Federal Sentencing Reporter: "If the judges of the
United States could vote, the guidelines would be repealed." Id. Judge Noonan expressed his concern that "neither constitutional law nor the law of evidence has kept
pace with the development of a system based on unadjudicated conduct." Id.
129.
130.

See Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2208.
See Halper, 490 U.S. at 447-48.

131.

Id. at 448.

132.

Cf Ball, 470 U.S. at 861 (reasoning that when a single act violates more

than one statute and Congress did not intend separate punishments, any additional
sentence imposed does not disappear merely because the sentence is served at the
same time as the other sentence).
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conviction based upon a second prosecution, would violate
Witte's double jeopardy rights.' 3
In conclusion, both McMillan and Witte should be overruled.
The holdings in McMillan and Witte are not separate, but
instead are joined in a symbiotic relationship. The violation of
due process rights sanctioned by McMillan creates the
opportunity for the violation of double jeopardy rights. The
violation of the double jeopardy rights sanctioned by Witte
exacerbates the violation of due process rights. Although the
words of the Fifth Amendment protect the accused from the
consequences of this unconstitutional process, the United States
Supreme Court, unfortunately, did not.
ChristineH. Nooning

133.
part).

Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2214 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

